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Trade blocs and currency blocs: a package
deal? *
Marion Kohler
European University Institute, Florence
Abstract
The size of a bloc o f countries practising some form o f coordina­
tion of monetary policy is limited by the incentive to free ride that 
the formation of the bloc creates. However, when the threat o f a 
trade war is introduced, this restriction on the size o f the bloc is 
diminished.
*1 want to thank Michael Artis and Mark Salmon for helpful discussions and com­























































































































































































The last decade has seen progress in international economic integration in 
various parts of the world. Formal regional economic arrangements have 
probably progressed the furthest in Europe with the creation of a customs 
union in 1956, the common market in 1992 and the prospects of a Euro­
pean Monetary Union by the end of the decade. Similar developments, can 
be observed in the Western Hemisphere with NAFTA and MERCOSUR. 
Though there are no formal monetary arrangements analogous to the EMS, 
many of these countries are de facto heavily dollarised since, when they 
decide to peg their currency they peg to the dollar. In South-East Asia, 
ASEAN provides the plan to form a free trade area, strengthening suspi­
cions of a Japanese sphere of influence in Asia.
A number of empirical studies (Frankel and Wei [9], [8]) have investigated 
this link between trade blocs and currency blocs. The theoretical moti­
vation behind attempts to strengthen currency links in free trade areas is 
seen in the reduction of the extent to which exchange rate risk discourages 
imports and exports, and thereby the promotion of stronger trade links. 
Based on similar arguments, the literature on the optimal exchange rate 
peg promotes the peg of an effective exchange rate based on the direction 
of total trade that is, bilateral rates of major trading partners have more 
weight1.
This paper provides a complementary explanation for the link between 
trade policy and monetary policy coordination. The use of policy instru­



























































































ments may be graduated in a way to make cooperation at the ‘lower’ level 
enforceable by the threat that, were it to fail, ‘higher’ level instruments 
would be used non-cooperatively. Basevi et al. [1] formalize such a game 
in a model for two countries which is based on a two-period general equi­
librium model with articulated micro foundations typically used in trade 
policy models. Monetary policy is effective because it is assumed that wa­
ges are fixed at a level above the Walrasian equilibrium level and are rigid 
downwards: this creates unemployment. Domestic money expansion which 
reduces unemployment will create a positive externality since it worsens 
the terms of trade of the home country. The country would like to coope­
rate in order to internalize the externality. It can enforce this cooperation 
by means of threatening to impose tariffs on the foreign good. These tariffs 
hurt the foreign economy whilst they do not affect the domestic economy 
in the model chosen by Basevi et al.. The latter feature, however, is due 
to very specific assumptions on how the tariff revenue is spent and to the 
policy objective function which maximizes the utility of the representative 
consumer.
While we will use the basic framwork of Basevi et al., we will apply it 
to a standard shock-stabilization game of monetary policy coordination, 
supplemented with the possibility to perform tariff policy. We will analyze 
the size of a ‘stable’ coalition in the context of an n country model. It 
has been shown that the free-rider incentive in monetary policy games can 
restrict the stable coalition size, see Martin [15] and -  for the type of model 
used here -  Kohler [11]. We will show in this paper that the prospect of 




























































































size of the stable coalition is determined by the feasible -  that is, credible 
-  size of the punishment tariff.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model 
and the reduced form; the mathematical derivation of the model can be 
found in appendices A and B. Section 3 presents a model of coalition 
formation with a package deal (mathematical solutions in appendix C). 
The stable coalition sizes are discussed in section 3.3 while sections 4.1 
and 4.2 discuss possible limits of the model with respect to the dynamics 
of coalition formation and the credibility of the punishment, respectively. 
The results of simulations performed for section 3.3 find 4.1 are presented 
in detail in appendix D. Section 5 concludes.
2 The underlying economy
The individual country’s economy is described by a standard model of 
monetary policy which rests on quadratic payoff functions and a linear and 
static macroeconomic model. It is consistent with the models in Canzoneri 
and Henderson [4], [5], Persson and Tabellini [17] and Buiter et al. [2]. We 
complement the model of Canzoneri and Henderson [4] with tariff policy 
and extend it to the n country case.
All variables are in natural logarithms, and are expressed in terms of de­
viations from their values in a zero-disturbance equilibrium except for r,j 
which is the (ad valorem) tariff imposed by country i on good j .  For 
simplicity, I refer for instance to the deviation of the money supply (log) 




























































































try’s variables are indexed by i while j  =  1 . . .  n, j  ^  i denotes the foreign 
countries. We will use a symmetric model, i.e. identical structures in all 
economies, since this allows us to focus on aspects of the coalition for­
mation process which are not driven by differences amongst countries but 
which are intrinsic to the process itself.
Each country specializes in the production of a national good, but consu­
mes all other goods, as well.
Output y, increases in employment /,-, subject to decreasing returns to 
scale, and decreases with some (world) productivity disturbance x (inde­
pendently distributed with mean 0).
Vi =  (1 -  a)li -  x 0 <  a <  1 (1)
Profit-maximizing firms hire labour up to the point at which real wages 
axe equal to the marginal product of labour. The money wage is denoted 
Wi while pi is the GDP deflator:
Wi — pi - —alt — x (2)
Home wage setters set w at the beginning of the period so as to fix em­
ployment at a full-employment level (/; =  0) if disturbances are zero and 
expectations axe fulfilled. They minimize the expected deviation of actual 
employment from full-employment by setting the nominal wage:
Wi =  m\ (3)
where m- is the expected money supply2. Actual labour demand might
2Equations 1, 2 and 4 give m =  w +  l. Home wage setters solve the optimization 
problem min^lSJn2] =  rrnnwE[(m  — to)2]. This is obviously minimized by setting w 




























































































differ due to unexpected disturbances. It is assumed that the wage setters 
guarantee that labour demanded is always supplied.
The market equilibrium for money is realized when the money supply 
satisfies a simple Cambridge equation:
m.i =Pi +  yi (4)
where m,- is the money supply.
Besides the tariffs which affect demand for the foreign goods directly, the 
real exchange rate3, Zy, is the only source of spillovers across countries. 
Defined as the relative price of the foreign good j ,  we can write z,-, as:
z>j =  ( e ij +  Pi ~  P i) (5 )
where e,-, is the nominal exchange rate and pi (pj) is the own-currency 
price of home (foreign) country goods. Thus a positive value of Zy reflects 
a real depreciation.
Real aggregate demand for good i is given by4:




j=i;*»■ i*i i -1  j±i
domestic government foreign private
demand demand
- E f t  + E E Ai=i i=ij±i j  =  1 h= 1 i*i h*i
effect of effect of trade diversion
domestic tariffs foreign tariffs effect
3 Z{j denotes the world market real exchange rate. Consumers face an ‘actual’ real
exchange rate which includes the tariff mark-up on the price of the foreign good.
4 The demand functions are derived from a combination of loglinearization and linear




























































































Since consumers spend a fixed share 1 — /? (0 < /? < 1) of their income 
on the domestic good (and, hence, ^  on each foreign good), demand for 
the domestic good rises with yj, j  =  1 ,n.  The foreign demands for 
the domestic good have to be ‘deflated’ by the respective tariffs, since the 
consumer price for a good imported from i is ej,p,( 1 +  7j,). ry denotes the 
tariff which country i imposes on goods imported from country j  while 0y 
is defined as the deviation of ln(l +  Ty) from its equilibrium value.
The tariff revenues are spent by the government exclusively on domestic 
goods; these purchases are denoted by the second term of the demand 
equation5.
A  rise in the relative price zy  of a foreign good shifts world demand from 
the foreign good to the home good by 6. A  rise in domestic tariffs on 
imports shifts domestic demand towards the own good by rj\ 3 , foreign tariffs 
imposed on  the domestic good shift foreign demand away from good i
5A standard assumption in trade policy models is that the tax revenues axe redistri­
buted to the consumers. In our model this would change only the size of the demand 
elasticities with respect to tariffs, r]i and 7/2, the tariff effects on the demand for the 
domestic good, w ill be smaller under redistribution since part of the tariff revenues are 
now spent on foreign goods. The effect on ‘third country’ demand, 7/3, will be larger for 
the same reason. Eventually, this will lead to a situation where the damage the tariff 
imposes on the domestic economy is larger while the damage for the foreign economy 
is smaller. The reason is that, while having the same direct impact on domestic CPI, 
the exchange rate movement induced by tariffs is not as favourable for the domestic 
country as in the case considered in the paper here. Hence, though there will still be 
a tariff which can sustain full cooperation, the tariff punishment is more likely not to 
be credible in the case of redistribution. We will discuss the issue of credibility of the 




























































































towards their own good by rf2' (»7i i V2 > 0; note that j]2 enters negatively 
in eqn. (6)).
While 771 and rj2 represent the effects of a tariff on the two countries which 
are directly affected, 773 represents an inverse of the trade diversion effect 
known from the theory of customs unions (see Viner[20]). A tariff imposed 
from country i on good j  will reduce domestic demand for good j .  In a two 
country framework there is only one way to spend the reduced outlay on the 
foreign good: the domestic good. In a multi-country framework, however, 
there is the possibility of substituting towards all remaining goods. This 
additional effect on countries ‘outside’ the tariff is denoted by 773.
Model symmetry and trade balance require that tariffs are zero in the dis­
turbance-free equilibrium that is, we are in a world-wide free trade area 
where no need for policy intervention arises, and that r]\3 — 771, tj2 =  rj2 
and r)2 =  773 for all i ^  j  that is, the responses to tariff changes are the 
same for all goods6.
Consequently, the goods market equilibrium can be written as:
P
p y i  ~  —T E V i = 6 za  + ’iiE ° i j  -  E 9a  + % E E  9ih
71 *  j  =  l  j  = l j = l j - 1 j - \  h =  l
j ? i  j ^ i  j ? i  j ? i  j ? i  h ^ i
(6)
The budget constraint requires that the decrease of demand for a foreign 
good on which a tariff is imposed is matched by an increase in demand 
for all other goods: r]2 — rft +  (n — 2)773. Tariffs and real exchange rates 
are part of the consumer prices. Hence, the respective elasticities of the 
demand functions, r]i, 772 and <5, can be expressed as function of each other




























































































which gives: 6 =  771+772 — That is, a rise in the real exchange
rate between two goods can be compared to the situation when a bilateral 
tariff is imposed where the domestic tariff is positive and the foreign tariff 
is negative (a import subsidy) such that both tariffs shift consumption 
towards the relatively cheaper good. However, the shift of consumption 
towards the domestic good is larger when caused by tariffs than by a 
real exchange rate depreciation since in the former case -  additionally to 
the substitution effect -  the tariff revenues are spent exclusively on the 
domestic good (this is denoted by the term ^ y )7-
The consumer price index <7; is a weighted average of the domestic and 
the foreign good prices where all prices are weighted according to the 
expenditure shares of the goods.
1i =  (1 ~  P)Pi +  — , X X eu +  Pi +  % ) =  P> +  +  % ) (7)n j=i n * j=1
Inflation may be imported via an appreciation of the foreign currency which 
is equivalent to a depreciation of the domestic currency. An increase in 
domestic tariffs will increase the CPI in the first place. However, as we will 
see below, the tariff will cause a real appreciation of the domestic currency 
which exerts an opposite effect on the domestic CPI.
2.1 Policymakers’ objectives
The policymaker in the home country has access to two policy instruments, 
m,-, which we identify with money growth, and r,j which we identify with




























































































the tariff rate imposed on imports from country j .  He evaluates the effects 
of monetary and trade policy according to a ‘welfare’ function defined as 
a linear quadratic payoff-function over CPI-inflation and employment.
Li =  \{crl] +  q}) (8)
where a denotes the relative weight the policymaker gives to the objective 
‘ full-employment ’ .
Monetary policy comes into effect when there is an (unexpected) symmetric 
productivity disturbance shock x. Private agents sign nominal contracts 
for wages. The policy maker knows the realization of the shock when 
setting m, but private agents have no information about it. This can 
reflect a genuine information advantage or else the relative costs of decision 
making: monetary policy can be altered at very short notice, whereas wage 
contracts cannot. This asymmetric information over the shock provides the 
role for stabilization policies8.
2.2 Reduced form of the economy’s behaviour
We can reduce equations (1) to (7) to two equations for each country9. 
They determine the constraints for the policymaker’s optimization pro­
blem. The money supply m,- and the tariffs Ty are free as instruments for 
minimizing the loss function.
8For an extensive discussion of this interpretation, see Persson and Tabellini [17].




























































































The reduced forms for q, are:
li =  rrii
qi =  Xm,i — k y  m,- +
j=i
n—1
/  ^ \ n „  n n n
( i - f )EA  + fE A -fE E «»
\ Ü /  J=1 v  j  =  l  v  j  =  l h = l
i#*' M*
(9)
+ x  (10)
with10:




n — 1 





%  = n — 2(t?2 -  »7i) Th,V2,V3,t> > 0  in most cases.
To set the basic policy problem, let us consider a symmetric world produc­
tivity disturbance which gives rise to a stabilization game. Without policy 
intervention a negative disturbance (x > 0) will have no effect on the 
countries’ employment and increases CPIs. Each country’s employment is 
unaffected because its nominal output is unaffected; a productivity distur­
bance lowers a country’s real output (according to equation (1)) and raises 
the price of its output by equal amounts (according to equation (4)). Mar­
ginal productivity of labour falls, so firms will keep employment constant 
only if increasing output prices lower real wages. All CPIs increase because
10The proof for the signs of the coefficients can be checked in appendix A.2 and B 




























































































all output prices rise. There are no changes in real exchange rates since 
outputs fall by the same amount in all countries because we have assumed 
symmetry and, hence, trade is still balanced.
If we add an international capital market like in Canzoneri and Hender­
son [5] or Kohler [11] real interest rates would have to change in order to 
equilibrate the goods markets11. Since the real and the nominal exchange 
rate do not change, perfect sustitutability on the international capital mar­
kets requires that the real interest rates in all countries rise by the same 
amount.
In short, a negative productivity shock will leave employment unchanged 
and increase CPI inflation.
Each policymaker -  facing a loss function which increases in the square of 
employment and CPI deviations -  now has an incentive to contract the 
money supply a little bit in order to lower inflation. He accepts the small 
loss from reducing employment below the full employment level in favour 
of the significant gain from lowering inflation.
11 When we include a capital market, only part of the income is used for consumption 
while the other part of the income is saved. Hence, the fall in output (supply) is not 
matched by the fall in demand for this good. A rise in real interest rates which reduces 
consumption further will reequilibrate the goods markets. Whether in this case nominal 
interest rates rise or fall depends on the size of two model parameters. When the real 
interest rate elasticity of goods demand is lower than the income elasticity of savings, 
nominal interest rates will rise; if it’s the other way around, nominal interest rates will 




























































































Monetary policy Contractionary monetary policy in country i alone 
produces an anti-inflationary effect through two channels: the reduction of 
the domestic output price and the export of inflation via the real exchange 
rate. Domestically, a reduction in the money supply has to be matched 
by a fall in nominal output (eqn. (4)) which affects both real output and 
prices (eqn. (1), (2)). The fall in output will reduce employment (eqn. (1)) 
while the fall in prices lowers CPI inflation. The export of inflation follows 
from the appreciation of the real exchange rate. The fall in output prices 
improves the terms of trade, lowers the prices of imports and thus lowers 
inflation. Abroad, the price of imports is increased, thus causing inflation. 
This externality is reflected in the negative coefficient (/c is positive) of for­
eign monetary policy in equation (10). If all policymakers contract money 
supplies, they vainly try to reduce their domestic inflation by attempting 
to appreciate their currencies against each other. The exchange rate in the 
end remains unchanged but all policymakers have contracted too much 
with respect to their optimal money supply. This could be avoided if all 
countries coordinated producing a less contractionary monetary policy12.
Tariff policy Tariff policy affects inflation without affecting employ­
ment. Domestically, nominal output is unaffected (eqn. (4) and -  with 
the marginal productivity of labour unchanged -  there is no change in 
employment, real output and output price (eqn. (1), (2)). The relative 
12Canzoneri and Gray [3] were the first to formalize this type of monetary policy game 
which subsequently became the standard argument in favour of international monetary 
policy coordination. The same type of model was analyzed by Canzoneri and Henderson 




























































































‘consumer’ price of the foreign good has increased through the tariff. Since 
this shifts domestic demand towards the own good, the domestic currency 
appreciates and, eventually, real demand for the domestic good does re­
mains constant (eqn. (6)). Consequently, imposing tariffs on imports has 
two contrasting effects on the domestic inflation: an anti-inflationary effect 
(— Y )  through the appreciation of the real exchange rate which makes for­
eign goods less expensive and a direct inflationary effect since tariffs make 
imported goods more expensive for the consumer. Depending on which 
effect dominates we can distinguish three cases: tariff policy reduces do­
mestic inflation (^- > 1), tariff policy affects only the foreign economies 
=  1) and tariff policy hurts the domestic economy (Y  < 1). Only in 
the first case, countries may want to try to use tariff policy instead of an- 
tiinflationary monetary policy. They will not have to ‘hurt’ the domestic 
economy by creating unemployment through anti-inflationary monetary 
policy but can export inflation without domestic costs. However, tariffs 
are an unsuitable instrument to fight inflation since it will lead directly 
into a trade war when the other countries try to shift the reed exchange 
rate back to its ‘original’ value. A world with tariffs all over the place is not 
desirable since it puts all countries in a worse position with higher CPIs, 
but the same real exchange rates. In the two latter cases, countries are 
not able to use tariff policy as a ‘direct’ instrument to fight inflation; ho­
wever, they may consider to use tariff threats to induce cooperation in the 
monetary field since tariffs always hurt the foreign economies by exporting 
inflation.




























































































can trace the three cases back to the properties of the underlying utility 
function or, more precisely, to the signs of the cross price effects13.
Tariff policy reduces inflation when the cross price effect is negative which 
occurs when we have normal goods which are complements. A typical 
example are Leontieff type utility functions, where the consumer wants 
to consume a basket of goods where the goods (in real terms) have fixed 
shares.
Tariff policy does not affect the domestic economy14 when there are no 
cross price effects; that is when the consumption of good i does not depend 
on the price of good j. This is for instance the case when the consumer 
spends always a fixed nominal share of his income on each good.
Tariff policy hurts the domestic economy when the cross price effects are 
positive. This is the case when goods are normal goods and substitutes. 
This case covers all ‘standard’ utility functions like CES or Cobb-Douglas 
utility functions.
If not otherwise noted, we will restrict ourselves in what follows to the last 
case which seems to be the most reasonable representation of consumption 
behaviour for a country with respect to a whole range of goods. Tariff 
policy will therefore hurt the domestic economy (a little bit) and the foreign
13For a detailed account, see appendix A.2, eqn. (15).
14This case is in some sense the counterpart to the model in Basevi et al. [1], In 
their model, tariffs do not affect the domestic economy although the crossprice effects 
are positive. The crucial difference to our model is that Basevi’s model targets private 
utility. The assumption of unproductive government purchases financed through tax 
revenues leads to a reduction of private utility. This negative effect is counterbalanced 
by an increase in domestic production and real income due to the shift of domestic 





























































































3 Coalition formation with a package deal
In the previous section we have outlined how policy makers will react to 
a negative productivity shock if they do not cooperate at all. Since they 
impose negative externalities on each other there is scope for improvement 
through cooperation. For this reason, the literature on international mone­
tary policy coordination has -  starting with the seminal work of Hamada 
[10] -  argued that coordination is beneficial for all parties involved15.
In Kohler [11], we have argued that countries may prefer forming a coalition 
to full coordination and we have solved the model with monetary policy 
and zero tariffs. The main result was that coalition formation will stop 
when it reaches a size of three countries. The reason is that the coalition 
formation process itself causes positive spillovers for the outsiders: the 
increased discipline within the coalition reduces the negative externalities 
the coalition countries create for all countries, independent of whether they 
are ‘in’s or ‘out’s. Countries will decide whether to join the union or not 
on the basis of whether it pays more to reduce imported inflation or to be 
able to export inflation.
Here, we will modify the type of ‘cooperation deal’ the coalition offers. 
The coalition will offer all members the possibility to coordinate monetary 
policy together with zero tariffs whereas the outsiders will face tariffs im­
posed on their goods in coalition markets. We will see that there always




























































































exists a tariff high enough that the incentive to free-ride on cooperation 
in monetary policies vanishes and only a coalition where all countries are 
members is stable.
3.1 The strategies and the equilibrium
3.1.1 The coalition strategy
A coalition is a subset of countries which optimize a common loss function. 
The common loss function is a weighted average of the individual countries’ 
loss functions. The relative weights are denoted a,- with Ylk=1 <*« =  1- Since 
we have a symmetric model structure we will assume that the individual 
countries’ weights are equal, hence, we will set the weight of a coalition 
member (a,-) equal to £ for all i =  1, . . . ,  A;16.
• The coalition consists of the countries * =  1, . . .  k and optimizes:
k 1
C = ^ \ Li i=i K
The coalition as a whole plays a Nash strategy in monetary policies 
against the outsiders.
• The remaining n — k countries play a non-cooperative Nash strat­
egy against all other countries by minimizing their individual loss 
functions.
16Typically, these weights are the outcome of a bargaining process. We will assume 
that -  due to the symmetric structure of the countries -  the bargaining process will 
lead to symmetric weights. However, we are aware that the weights are not necessarily 





























































































Since tariffs hurt the domestic economy, setting any tariff above zero is 
suboptimal for the coalition if we were to consider monetary and tariff 
policies separately. However, we will see that a positive ‘punishment’ tariff 
can create an incentive scheme which can overcome the free-riding incentive 
of monetary policy coordination. The mere threat to punish on the trade 
sector can be sufficient to induce full cooperation. Therefore, it may be in 
the interest of the coalition to be able to commit to the package deal and 
to exclude the possibility to set the two policies separately.
We will solve the model by first determining the equilibrium policies for 
a given coalition size. We will do this by fixing the tariffs on a given le­
vel and calculating the optimal monetary policies depending on this level. 
Then, we will determine the stable coalition size dependent on the chosen 
‘punishment’ tariff level. We will see that different tariff levels will su­
stain different stable coalition sizes. The tariff level which can sustain full 
cooperation will be called threshold tariff.
Roughly speaking, the punishment must be high enough in order to be 
effective, but low enough in order to be credible. The exact meaning of 
‘credible’ has to be answered in the context of the game: within a static 
game, it means that it pays for the coalition to choose this strategy; within 
a (infinitely) repeated game, it can be credible through trigger-strategies 
of the Friedman type and within an extensive game it has to fulfill the 
criterion of subgameperfection. If the strategy leading to the highest pay­
off is not a best response, the coalition has to find a way to exclude the best- 
response strategy i.e. by credibly committing to the punishment strategy. 




























































































assume that the coalition offers only the package deal but not monetary 
policy coordination alone. We will relax this assumption later.
Once a coalition member, a country will have to stick to the coalition policy. 
However, the decision whether a country wants to join the coalition or not 
has to be incentive compatible for each individual country. Consequently, 
we will call a coalition “stable” when no country would like to change its 
affiliation (coalition or fringe) unilaterally. The idea behind this is that 
an equilibrium with a coalition size where the coalition members prefer to 
join the fringe or vice versa is not sustainable. We will adopt a stability 
concept used to examine the stability of cartels in models of industrial 
organization17:
Lc(k*,n) <  Lnc(k* — l ,n)  and Lnc(k*,n) < Lc(k* +  l ,n)
The loss function of a non-member is denoted by Lnc(n, k). If it joins the 
coalition, it will have the loss Lc(n,k +  1). If Lnc(n, k) is smaller than 
Lc(n,k  +  1), the country has no incentive to join the coalition and the 
coalition is called “externally stable” . If, on the other hand no member 
from the coalition has an incentive to leave the coalition, the coalition is 
“internally stable” . If both conditions are fulfilled, the coalition is stable, 
with size k.
We will present now the equilibrium strategies (that is, optimal money 
supplies) given the coalition size and given the tariff levels18.
17The stability condition used here is based on the one proposed by D ’Aspremont et 
al. [7],
18The results are derived in Appendix C. We will keep the analysis short since this 




























































































3.1.2 The equilibrium strategies and losses outside the coalition
In order to solve the outsider’s optimization problem, we replace n; and 3, 
in the loss function by the reduced form equations. This function is mini­
mized with respect to m, subject to given strategies of the other countries 
rrij =  rrij nc for all j  7̂  i if j  is an outsider and m;- =  mJiC for all j  if j  is a 
coalition member. Since we have a symmetric structure in every respect, 
we can assume that all countries outside the coalition have the same opti­
mal money supply m*c. We can derive the money supply of a non-member 
as a function of the coalition’s money supply:
k
m nc -  m i ,' ~  & [0 "c +  X] C11)
i=1
with: 1? __________ A__________
a +  \2 — A n(n — k — 1) > 0
where 0 nc is the impact of the tariff structure faced by an outsider. The 
optimal policy outside the coalition depends positively on coalition policy 
i.e. the money supplies of a non-member and a coalition member are 
strategic complements. This means that a less contractionary monetary 
policy of the coalition members triggers a less contractionary response from 
the non-members since imported inflation is reduced.
3.1.3 The Nash equilibrium with a coalition
The coalition solves its optimization problem subject to a given money 
supply of the non-members. We exploit the symmetry assumption m* c =  





























































































which depends on the non-members’ money supply. Through equating 
the reaction functions we obtain the equilibrium of the Nash game with a 
coalition as:
m* =  -p[#e(n -  k)flQnc +  0 C] -  p[/c(n -  +  l]x (12)
m*nc =  -  [u/0nc +  Ki!}kpQc  ̂ — [w +  /cMp] x (13)
with:
A —  k  (k —  1)
^ a +  (A — n(k — 1))(A — n(k — 1) — /c2(n — k)flk) >  
u> =  K2d2kp(n — k) +  d >  0
The equilibrium policies in both games are linear functions of the shock x. 
If the shock is zero, there is no need for a stabilization game and, hence, 
the optimal policies axe zero (0 C =  0 nc =  0 when there are no tariffs). If 
the shock is negative, i.e. x >  0, the optimal policy for all countries is a 
contractionary monetary policy since p and u are positive19, respectively.
3.2 The punishment tariff structure
One feature of the model is crucial for the result in the game when only mo­
netary policy is available: countries have only one instrument for monetary 
policy available which does not allow them to impose different externalities 
on members and non-members. Hence, a free-rider problem occurs which 
causes instability for coalitions of a size higher than three. With tariff po­
licy, however, countries have an instrument available which allows them to




























































































apply a different tariff policy to ‘friends’ or ‘enemies’ . Consequently, they 
could force countries to join the coalition by threatening them to punish 
them if they do not do cooperate.
In economic terms, the coalition threatens to form a customs union against 
the outsiders which will worsen the outsiders’ welfare by appreciating the 
coalition’s currencies and, hence, increasing the outsiders’ inflation.
In order to determine the effects of the punishment on the coalition and the 
outsiders we will now make some assumptions about a reasonable tariff- 
punishment structure and, accordingly, evaluate the expression for 0 C and
One-
• The coalition forms a customs union. This means that all coalition 
members apply the same tariff to a specific outsider and that tariffs 
within the coalition are zero.
The assumption of a customs union does not necessarily imply the 
coédition imposes the same tariff on all outsiders. However, since we 
have symmetric countries outside the coalition, all outsiders face the 
same tariff from the coalition.
• Tariffs are only used as means of punishment20 by the coalition which 
wants to force the outsiders to cooperate. We assume that tariffs will 
not be used by outsiders to retaliate since a retaliation would be much 
more costly to an outsider (who has to punish all coalition members)
20Since we focus on the case where tariffs hurt the domestic and the foreign eco­
nomy, tariffs will never be used ‘in the first place’ but only as means of punishment 





























































































than the damage it imposes on each coalition member. This is true 
in particular for larger coalitions like the ‘package-upgrade’ scenario 
discussed below. All tariffs imposed by non-members will therefore 
be zero21.
We can then simplify 0 C and 0 nc where 8C denotes the tariff imposed by 
the coalition on outsiders. For a coalition member this gives
0 c = ; £ [ l - | - f ( * - l ) ] ( n - * ) 0c ,
for an outsider,
e *c =  £  [ y  -  y  (n -  k -  1)] k6c =  ^  [ y  +  y  (* -  1)] k8c
21If we allow for retaliation tariffs imposed by non-members on the coalition, that is 
6nc > 0, we can write 0  as:
®« = 5ÉT I1 -  y -  y (* -  X)1(n “ k)e‘  + &  [y "  y (* ~1}](n "  k)9n<
for a coEihtion member and
= n̂ î [y -  y(» -  k -  i)] Mc + é î  I1 -  y -  y(« -  * -  1)] k0nc
for an outsider. While the first terms of each equation denote the damages or costs 
of a punishment tariff imposed by the coédition, the second terms denote the costs or 
damages of a retaliation tariff imposed by the outsiders. It can be easily checked that 
the costs of a punishment tariff for the coalition decrease with coalition size while the 
damage it causes for the outsiders increases. In contrast, the costs of a retaliation 
tariff 6 nc for an outsider increase with coalition size while the damage it creates for 
the coalition decreases. Hence, punishment tariffs from the coalition are much more 
effective and credible than retaliation tariffs from the outsiders when we have higher 
coalition sizes. This justifies our assumption that outsiders do not retaliate in particular 




























































































In both cases, a tariff imposed by the coalition has a negative impact on 
the domestic economy since it increases 0 22 and, hence, according to eqn. 
(10) increases the inflation whereas it leaves employment unaffected in the 
first place. It should be noted, however, that the inflationary impact on 
the outsiders’ economies is increasing with increasing coalition size while 
the impact on the coalition economies is decreasing.
3.3 The stability of coalitions
The coefficients p and lo in the equilibrium policies are non-linear functions 
of the model parameters. Hence, it is difficult to analyze analytically 
how the model parameters, in particular k and r, affect the equilibrium 
outcome. This is even more the case, if we wish to analyze the stability of 
the coalition which is determined by differences in the losses which Eire in 
turn quadratic in the optimal policies. One possible approach is to perform 
numerical simulations with specific values for the model parameters whilst 
varying n, k and r. We report here only a summary of the most important 
results; more detailed results and the results of the sensitivity analysis can 
be checked in Appendix D. We first evaluate how tariffs affect external and 
internal stability of the coalition and then determine the stable coalition 
size.
22t/i and 7/2 are positive which explains an inflationary impact for outsiders. The 
impact on coalition members is inflationary since 8  =  771 + y j  + 773(72 — 2) >  r/i +rj^(k~ 1) 




























































































3.3.1 Tariff impact on external and internal stability
The coalition is externally stable when no outsider wants to join the coali­
tion. It is internally stable when no member of the coalition wants to 
leave it. The graphs in figures 1 to 5 below interpret the stability conditi­
ons when we have n =  22 countries. When the “gains from changing the 
group” are negative for both groups, coalition and outsiders, the coalition 
is stable. A coalition where all countries are members is externally sta­
ble by definition since there is no outsider left to join -  this explains the 
“jump” of the graph for external stability from a coalition size of k =  21
to k =  22.
G a in s  f r o m  c h a n g i n g  t h e  g r o u p  ( n  =  2 2 )  f o r  t  = 0 . 0
Figure 1 : External and internal stability with zero tariffs0 
“Negative “gains from changing the group” imply that keeping its affiliation does 





























































































Figure 1 shows the stability of the coalition when there are no punishment 
tariffs but only monetary policy. The “Gains from leaving the coalition” 
represent the internal stability condition (Lc(k) — Lnc(k — 1) < 0); the 
“Gains from joining the coalition” which could be named “Gains from 
leaving the fringe” describes the external stability condition (Lnc(k) — 
Lc(k +  1) <  0). Here, the stable coalition size is three. Above a coalition 
size of three it pays for countries to leave the coalition and to profit from 
the spillovers of coalition discipline whilst playing an individually optimal 
response. With increasing coalition size the potential profits from free­
riding become even larger. Below three, on the other hand, it pays to 
form a coalition with other countries in order to reduce the competitive 
appreciation of uncoordinated monetary policy. In the monetary policy 
game with zero tariffs the outsiders are always better off than the coalition 
members since monetary policies are strategic complements, see Kohler 
[111-
Figures 2 to 5 show how external and internal stability develops for different 
tariffs.
The ‘gains from leaving the coalition’ which represent internal instability 
decrease with increasing coalition size before they start rising again, possi­
bly into the positive area which denotes instability. Two effects shape this 
function.
The damage which tariffs impose on the outsiders increases with coalition 
size. On the other hand, the damage which tariffs cause to the coalition 
economies through inflation of the CPI decreases with coalition size. Com­






























































































Gains from changing the group (n=22) for r  =0.3 Gains from changing the group (n=22) for r =0.4
Figure 2: Stability conditions for Figure 3: Stability conditions for
t =  0.3 r =  0.4
Gains from changing the group (n=22) for r =0.5 Gains from changing the group (n=22) for r =0.8
Number of coalition members k Number of coalition members k
Figure 5: Stability conditions for
r =  0.6
increasing coalition size23. This is even more the case for higher tariffs,
23The effect, which r]3 has on the economies can be neglected since, especially for 
‘medium’ k, both groups enjoy a similar exposure to'Hhird party effects’ : (n — k — l)kr]3 
for the outsiders and {n — k){k — 1)173 for the coalition.





























































































since part of the tariff effect is counterbalanced by a more contractionary 
monetary policy (both optimal monetary policies are negatively dependent 
on 0 ) which increases ‘genuine’ incentives to coordinate monetary policies. 
This diminishing effect is moderated by the free-riding incentive of mone­
tary policy coordination which can be best observed in the game with 
zero tariffs. Internal stability without tariffs decreases with coalition size 
because of the reduced coalition externalities which create a free-riding in­
centive. When higher coalition sizes are reached, the incentive to free-ride 
dominates, which explains the U-shaped function for internal stability.
External stability is influenced by the same factors, which now work the 
other way around. For a low coédition size, incentives to join the coalition 
are small, since damages are only imposed through few tariffs, whereas 
the countries imposing the tariffs have to face a relatively high cost, since 
they have to punish a large outsider group. This stance, however, is coun­
terbalanced by an intrinsic gain from coordinating on monetary policy for 
low k. With increasing coalition size it becomes more desirable to join the 
coalition because of the increasing tariff burden outside and the decreasing 
tariff burden inside the coalition. Finally, the free-riding incentives become 
dominant here, as well, and the gains from joining the coalition become 
lesser.
3.3.2 Threshold tariff level
An increase in the tariff r  ‘shifts’ the stability functions: the external 
stability function is shifted upwards and the internal stability function 




























































































the tariff burden becomes too heavy for the outsiders and the free-riding 
incentive is not yet large enough for coalition members to leave, is larger 
the higher the tariff. If this ‘middle’ part, where the coalition is externally 
not stable and internally stable, extends over the full coordination point 
of k* =  n, we can reach full coordination as a stable coalition since at this 
point the coalition is externally stable, since there are no countries left to 
contemplate the participation decision.
P a r a m e t e r  v a l u e
Figure 6: The threshold tariff level for different values of a,/3 and a
We have calculated the threshold tariff level that is, the minimum tariff 
level which sustains full coordination dependent on the values for the model 
parameters. The results of the analysis are illustrated in figure 6 which 
shows the threshold tariff for different values of the parameters a,f3 and 
cr24. In short, the parameter which influences the threshold tariff level




























































































most, is (1-a) which denotes the productivity of labour. For a > 0.5, the 
highest threshold tariff level is 0.3, that is a thirty percent ad valorem tariff 
on the price of the imported good. Very low values of a require a tariff of 
above one or two hundred percent, a  affects the size of the threshold tariff 
level much more than any other parameter because it changes the relative 
importance of being able to free-ride and of avoiding a tariff punishment. 
A high a (a low labour productivity, that is) implies that the externalities 
of foreign monetary policy (n) are low and the effectiveness of domestic 
monetary policy (A) is high. In a situation like this, coordinated and non- 
coordinated monetary policies are not very different and, hence, gains from 
being able to free ride are not very high. Since the impact of the tariff does 
not depend on a, it is much less profitable to bear a tariff punishment in 
order to simply exploit the gains from free-riding if a is low.
Though the influence of the other parameters is much less significau . the 
threshold tariff level decreases with increasing (3, rj\ and rj2- A higher pro­
pensity to import and higher tariff elasticities of demands, respectively, 
increase the impact of the tariff punishment Qnc and, hence, act as if the 
tariff was higher.
The threshold tariff level increases, however, with the number of the coun­
tries n. The reason is, that an increase in n reduces ©nc, the measure of 
the damage caused by the tariffs for the outsider and, therefore, a higher 
tariff is necessary for the punishment to be effective.
dard values’, that is a =  /3 =  0.5 and a =  1. The detailed results of this analysis (inch 
the results for the parameters and rj2) and the results of the multivariate analysis




























































































The threshold tariff increases, too, with a, the weight of the employment 
target in the loss function. Since the tariff damages the outsider’s eco­
nomy through inflation the tariff punishment is much more effective when 
inflation has a relatively high priority, that is for a low a. Only when 
priority shifts to the full-employment target that is, a increases, will the 
inflationary damage a tariff causes become less important. Then, only a 
high penalty will create enough inflation so that countries will try to avoid 
the tariff punishment.
4 Dynamic aspects of the package deal
Up to now, we have focussed on static aspects of the stability of the coali­
tion. The idea being that a given coalition is not sustainable if it is not 
stable in the sense that it must be individually optimal for a country to 
be a coalition member. We have assumed that the coalition does not offer 
coordination in a single field but a package deal.
In the following two sections, we will discuss two different aspects of the 
‘stable coalition’ which are somewhat more of a ‘dynamic’ nature since 
they deal with the formation of the coalition and the credibility of the 
package deal.
4.1 The process of coalition formation
We have pointed out that there is always a tariff level high enough that it 




























































































be a problem of ‘getting the coalition off the ground’ when we consider 
some kind of coalition formation process.
As can be seen in figures 1 to 5, for a very low coalition size (below four or 
five members) the coalition is internally not stable but externally stable. 
That is, no country wants to join the coalition and coalition members want 
to leave it. This situation changes however, when the coalition has a larger 
size: outsiders then want to join the coalition and insiders do not want to 
leave it. If we were now to consider a coalition formation process where 
one country enters after the other we may face problems if the group of 
‘founding members’ is too small since then we wouldn’t be able to reach 
the ‘critical size’.
We may indicate two ways out of this dilemma. First, we argue that our 
model may be more appropriate for a situation of a ‘package upgrade’ of 
an already existing customs union than a model for coalition formation 
starting with two members. The game considered so far is not one of 
an intrinsically dynamic nature. A game which explicitly deals with the 
formation of the coalition would have to take other dynamic features of 
monetary policy games, like expectation formation of the private secotr 
over time, into consideration. Most likely, the theory of repeated games 
which eases the sustainability of coordination outcomes, would have to be 
applied, as well. All these aspects are neglected here and, therefore, the 
model is probably less suitable to explain a dynamic process like coalition 
formation.
However, if we start from an already existing trade bloc, we could easily 




























































































‘automatic’ : there are negative gains from leaving the coalition but positive 
ones from joining it. Hence, the model may serve as a potential application 
where we have a ‘package upgrade’ from a trade block to a currency block 
in mind. In this light, we may present an alternative interpretation of the 
‘Fortress Europe’ idea. Typically, ‘Fortress Europe’ denotes the establis­
hment or increase of external barriers of an internal European economic 
policy bloc. This creation of barriers is generally considered to be the re­
sult of the efforts of all members to keep their existing national protection. 
We provide a complementary explanation: threats of outside tariffs could 
be used to sustain policy cooperation in other economic areas.
Another feature, which is worthwhile noting, could provide a second so­
lution to the ‘starting problem’. In particular for higher tariffs (r > 0.5) 
and more countries (n > 9) losses inside the coalition are lower than out­
side the coalition. This can provide a motivation for countries to go ahead 
and join the coalition early. They may want to belong to the ‘lucky ones’ , 
the insiders that is, in case the tariff punishments are actually imposed on 
outsiders. This incentive may help to reach the critical initial size of the 
coalition.
4.2 The credibility of punishment in an extensive 
game
We have excluded so far the question of the credibility of the punishment 
by assuming that the coalition will only have the choice of adopting the 




























































































is justified in that the coalition knows that with monetary policy alone it 
can not sustain a coalition with more than three countries. Therefore, it 
would like to be able to commit to the ‘package deal’ , particularly, since it 
is possible to sustain full coordination and, hence, tariffs axe only a threat 
but not actually imposed. We may ask, however, what happens if the 
coalition cannot commit credibly for instance on institutional grounds.
A  chain store paradox In order to answer this question it may be 
reasonable to split the game into a two stage game as in Basevi et al. [1], 
In the first stage, monetary policy is conducted and the coalition is decided 
upon. In the second stage, the outsiders are supposed to be punished by 
tariffs imposed by the coalition.
The extensive game has the structure of the ‘chain store paradox’ discussed 
in Selten [19]25. Like the incumbent in Selten’s model, the coalition would 
prefer to credibly commit to the threat of tariff punishments. However, 
once the coalition is formed it is not optimal to actually carry out the 
punishment since it would hurt the coalition, as well. If we were to select 
strictly sub-game perfect equilibria only, the coalition’s ‘rational’ choice
25In Selten’s model, a chain store operates in N markets, in each of which there is 
a prospective entrant. In case of entry of the competitor, the incumbent can either 
fight or accomodate. The entrant’s profit is positive if the incumbent accomodates, and 
negative if he fights. The incumbent incurs negative profits if he fights, positive profits if 
he accomodates, and the highest profits if the competitors stay out. Decisions are made 
sequentially. In the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, all potential competitors enter 
and the chain store behaves passively in all markets. However, intuition suggests that 
the chain store should act aggressively towards early entrants in order to deter later 




























































































would be not to impose any tariff punishments and the outsiders would 
not join the coalition beyond size three.
Selten argues, however, that sub-game perfection does not select the in­
tuitively most plausible solution for such a game. Intuitively, one would 
expect that the coalition will be willing to carry out the punishments the 
first times they become necessary in order to build up a reputation to be 
‘tough’ and hence, to avoid the situation where other countries do not join 
the coalition. Only if the potential gains from maintaining the reputation 
are lower than the costs of tariff punishments, would the coalition not try 
to build up a reputation.
We have performed a numerical analysis in order to evaluate whether the 
costs of punishment exceed the potential gains through reputation. The 
potential gains are determined by the difference of the losses between the 
actual coalition size and a coalition of three countries. The results of the 
analysis are summarized in table l 26. We have determined the (maximum) 
number of deviators which can be punished with the threshold tariff. This 
implies a minimum coalition size which is necessary that punishment of 
deviators pays off. Even though the punishment hurts the coalition coun­
tries, they are still better off than without tariff threats (with a coalition 
of three, that is) in these cases.
The analysis shows that if we have six countries, it pays to fight one or 
two countries which deviate. If we have seven (or more) countries, even 
three deviators (or more) can be punished if this leads to a coalition which 
comprises the remaining countries, that is one more country than the stable




























































































Number o f  countries n = 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
M ax. number o f  deviators 
M in. coalition size
0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6  
(3) (3) (3) 4 4 4 4 4
Table 1: Punishment of deviators
coalition when there are no tariffs. Hence, the gains from having one more 
countries in the coalition outweighs the losses of punishing all the remaining 
countries27. Each country which would like to leave the coalition is likely to 
be punished since this may ensure that the ‘necessary’ four or five countries 
remain in the coalition. Therefore, no country will want to stay out.
This solution, however, is not formal since building up a reputation requires 
a model of sequential entrance. The following paragraph suggests what 
such a formal model might look but we leave the analysis for later work.
Solutions to the paradox Kreps and Wilson [12] and Milgrom and 
Roberts [16] have suggested a resolution to the paradox28, based on a
27These results do not vary with the parameter values, see appendix D. They have 
been tested only up to a total number of 10 countries, though. For more countries there
is probably a limit to the size of the fringe.
28The model they suggest is modified in that the incumbent can now be either weak
or strong. If he is strong, he ‘enjoys’ fighting since it is his dominant strategy. If he 
is weak, fighting is costly and can be worthwhile only if it raises profits in another 
market through building up a reputation for being ‘strong’ . Only the incumbent knows 
whether he is ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ . The sub-game perfect equilibrium of this game has the 
following features: in the first markets entry does not occur. If a firm would enter by 
mistake, it would be fought by both types. Because the number of markets shrink over 




























































































model of incomplete information on the outsider’s part regarding the ‘type’ 
of the coalition. It is assumed that the outsider does not know which 
‘type’ the coalition is, a ‘tough’ type which punishes or a ‘soft’ type which 
accomodate if challenged (the differences are justified through different 
payoff matrices which could be different preferences in the payoff). The 
tough type will always punish since it is his dominant strategy, whereas 
the soft type will only punish in order to build up a reputation of being 
tough. If the probability that the coalition is tough is high enough, no 
outsider will initially dare to stay out. Only after several countries have 
joined the coalition will some countries try to stay outside and accept the 
risk of being punished.
In order to formalize such a model, however, one has to justify incomplete 
information and different types of payoff functions for the coalition, one of 
which has to have a dominant strategy of imposing tariffs on outsiders, for 
international policy games. An example of the latter is that there may be 
a different loss function for the coalition resulting from further profits from 
the imposition of tariffs. One could draw in this context from the trade 
policy literature where the existence of tariffs is explained either with the 
existence of increasing returns to scale29 or with lobbying industries which 
seek protection in models of the political economy of trade policy30. Addi­
tionally, it is necessary to introduce some degree of incomplete information 
on the side of the outsider.
This equilibrium requires that the probability of being strong is not too small.
29See e.g. Krugman [13] for the seminal work in this area or Krugman [14] for a
comprehensive survey.




























































































Extending the game into a game of sequential entrance that is, giving it 
a time dimension, opens up different solution concepts based on repeated 
games. In infinitely repeated games, generally speaking, it is easier to 
sustain cooperative outcomes following the reasoning of the folk theorem. 
Then, we would probably get different results even in the pure monetary 
policy cooperation game. Additionally, adding a time dimension would 
require an explicitly dynamic model which would deal with such issues as 
those of credibility of the monetary authority towards the private sector. 
We leave this for further work in the future.
5 Conclusion
In the real world so-called ‘package deals’ can be more often observed 
than simple coordination in specific policy fields. This paper provides a 
formal model which tries to explain why this comes about and what the 
advantages of a package deal vis-à-vis single policy coordination are.
As opposed to the model used in Basevi et al. [1] in order to evaluate 
‘package deal’ questions, we have extended our model to more than two 
countries and can therefore cover the issue of a customs union which wants 
to extend coordination to the monetary field. The customs union can be 
exploited strategically to influence the formation of a currency bloc. 
Monetary policy coordination alone provides small incentives to form larger 
blocs since the free-riding incentive dominates the gains from cooperation 
in this case. Tariff policy threats, however, add an incentive which can 




























































































most important difference of the two policy instruments is that monetary 
policy does not allow the policy maker to apply a different policy to co- 
operators and to defectors while tariff policy allows to distinguish between 
them.
Our model does not claim to be able to explain the existence of trade policy 
but it should be seen rather as complementary to classical trade policy 
models. We aim at formalizing some strategic aspects of using trade policy 
outside of ‘genuine’ trade policy areas. This is why we choose as a starting 
point a model used to explain monetary policy coordination, focussing on 
demand structures -  in contrast to many trade and customs union models 
which explain coalition formation with production structures.
This paper, however, has also shown the limits of applying trade policy 
in models which are mainly used to explain monetary policy coordination. 
In these models, trade policy will generally not be profitable for either 
economy. Consequently, the tariff punishment may face problems of credi­
bility, particularly, if the threshold tariff is high. Then, we have either to 
lower the ‘damage’ and risk that full coordination cannot be sustained or 
we have to modify the model in line with the reputation models of Kreps 
and Wilson [12] and Milgrom and Roberts [16]. In this case, too, full 




























































































Appendix A: Deriving the demand equation
A .l Linear approximation of the demand function
The real aggregate demand function for good i is derived from a com­
bination of loglinearization and linear approximation of the expenditure 
functions following the procedure proposed by Canzoneri and Henderson 
[4], P-100.
Aggregate demand for good i is the sum of domestic private demand, 
foreign private demand and domestic public demand. The latter is equal 
to the domestic tariff revenues which the government spends exclusively 
on the domestic good.
f '3 denotes the expenditure function of country i on good j .  All capital 
letter variables denote the respective variables in levels. Nominal expen­
diture is dependent on income (which equals nominal output in our model 
if money markets are in equilibrium) and the respective domestic prices of 
all goods. Hence, nominal expenditures (in domestic currency) are:
f U ( E ihP >, (1  -{- r",7i )  )^  __  ̂ ] domestic private outlays for good t
f 13 , ( -E,/i P t, (1  -{- ~ih )  }  ̂  _  j ] domestic private outlays for good j
f 3' [P jY j, {E jf ,P h (  1 +  T jh )}h _  l n] foreign private outlays for good i
All real expenses are in terms of units of good i. The price of the domestic 
good abroad is EjiPi( 1 +  r^) =  P‘^+Tj‘ '>; hence, the foreign demands for 
good i have to be multiplied by p ) . Bearing in mind that expenditure 




























































































and in ad valorem tariffs (1 +  r)), the real aggregate demand for good i in 
levels is:
n n
Y i = f"lY„{zih(i+Tth)} \ + J 2 i r k
i=i 3*i
n - ]  + E  n k  f ]'[Z,]Yj ,{Zth(l+ r]h)}h
J'=1
(14)
where Zy =  £y  yt denotes the real exchange rate between good i and 
good j .
Like in Canzoneri and Henderson [4], taking logarithms, linearizing around 
the disturbance-free equilibrium values lnY.-, etc. and replacing y =  
(lnY) -  InHj), zy — (InZy -  InZy) and 0y =  (ln(l 4- TtJ)  -  ln(l +  r ,_,•))
gives:
Vi = [fo + È  T & jfo] Vi +  E  [hM '1 W+i=i i=i




h = l ĥ i
6'>
E + E -i=i h=l
t y^r - *m %.] •» *tt in t e r i  ̂  »jhj=i >j** 2̂* j = l h = l ’ Ì96*
where the subscripts denote partial derivatives with respect to the (h+l)th  
argument, that is e.g. / q' denotes the derivative of f 3’ with respect to the 
real income of country j  whereas f 3h' denotes the derivative of / J1 with 
respect to the domestic (in country j  that is) real price of good h.




























































































constraint requires that / q* +  £?=i =  1 and f'hl -f X)?=i fh =
j*i 3*i
Vi =  I1 -  Ë  ük~df'Ay' +  È  [ r f e / i ' l  yj +  E  +i=i ;'=i ;=i
Ë  -  Ë  +  E  Ei=i
i * i
i=i J=1 fc=l j±\ ĥ i
Similarily, the real demand for good k while i is the numéraire good can 
be derived:
yk =  [ i -  Ë  v k j f F )  y* +  Ë  [ ï ï M I  Vi +  Ë  +
i = 1 i= l  J=1i** >9Éfc J**
[ ^ -  E  /o J] *«■* +  E  7?iJ -  E  ^  eik +  E  E  ^
i=i i  = l i** i= l j - 1 fc=l
A .2 Restrictions on the elasticities
In this paragraph we derive the restrictions several model features impose 





Whereas the first two conditions must hold since we are in a general equi­
librium framework, the latter is an assumption. Walras’ law must hold 
with equality when the budget constraints hold with equality and trade 




























































































restrictions on the properties of the expenditure functions and, hence, on 
the elasticities 771, 7/2»% and 6.
Walras’ law requires that the n goods demands are linear dependent. 
Summing up all demand equations yields only an identity for all variable 
values if
rft =  V? +  ( « - 2K
This condition describes the redistribution of domestic outlay following a 
decrease in demand for good j  due to a tariff imposed on this good. The 
outlay reduction for good j  is distributed to good i according to the elasti­
city jji and, in equal parts since we have symmetric expenditure functions, 
to the remaining n — 2 goods.
Trade balance Trade must be always balanced since we have no capital
markets. Substituting the budget constraint Yt =  /"[•] +  Z)?=i /'■’ [•] into
}*<
the goods demand (14) gives the trade balance:
i=1 i* » j= l
Hence, the trade balance restriction is ensured when the budget constraints 
are fulfilled and goods markets are cleared.
In the long run equilibrium -  with natural rates of output being the same 
in all countries and an equilibrium real exchange rate of unity -  bilateral 
tariffs must be equal. Either, monetary or tariff policy, would shift the eco­




























































































takes its minimum value. Consequently, the pareto-efficient tariff struc­
ture in the long-run equilibrium are zero tariffs, since tariffs would only 
increase the CPI but not affect the real exchange rate because all bilateral 
tariffs have to be equal. That is,
Tij =  Tji Vj, i
Using zero-equilibrium tariffs and the budget constraints while equilibrium 
real exchange rates axe unity and natural rates of output axe Y  we can 
write:
i f  =  [ / f + r ] i
4 ‘ =  \ f - f i ‘U  =  «
h=l
4 h = m
6ij = [ t ff -  £  / f  + Toy] 7 = + £  //*>
h = i  h = i  h = i
hq&i h^ti h jti
Model symmetry requires that the partial derivatives of the expendi­
ture functions across countries and across goods are symmetric, this inclu­
des:
31 Expenditure functions are always linear homogenous in prices and in our model they 
are linear homogenous in the income, as well. Then the Euler theorem is applicable:
r = f i % jYj + ± f i % h
k=l




























































































• The shares of additional income which are spent on domestic (for­
eign) goods are equal across countries: Tq :=  / q‘ =  f l 3 and Tl :=
f t  =  fl'
• The own (real) price effects of domestic (foreign) goods are equal 
across countries: T\ :=  f "  — f j 3 and J-j :=  / / '  =  f 'j  Vj ^  i
• The cross (real) price effects of domestic (foreign) goods are equal 
across countries and goods: T'j :=  / "  =  f j3 =  32f\3 =  fj ' and J-3h :=
r t  =  f j h =  f i :
With these conditions, elasticities do not differ across goods and, hence, 
we can drop the superscripts of 6, 771, 7/2 and 773. Furthermore, we can now 
express 6 as a function of rji and 772 that is, 6 =  771 +  772 —
With the model symmetry we can rewrite the elasticities.
m =  [ri + T j \$  =  { - { n - 2 ) r t - F j + 7 i }$
m =  [ - ^ ' + r ] £  =  [ ( n - 2 ) r t + ? j \ $ + n
m =  H ?
6 =  [2Fj +  ( n - 2 ) ? i ] $  +  F 3 = r )l +  [Fj +  ( n - 2 ) r t ] $  (15)
An intuitive explanation of the last expression for 6 goes as follows. A ta­
riff on good j  (imposed by country i) changes the demand for good i as if 
the price of good j  had increased (6) minus the substitution effects abroad, 
since only domestic demand shifts whereas foreign demand remains unal­
tered in the first place. The cross price effects are equal across countries 
due to the symmetry. 32




























































































If r]i is positive, then is only larger than one if the cross price effects are 
negative. Then, however, 6 might become negative. If r\i is negative, ^  
is always smaller than one since this case can only occur when the cross 
price effects are negative.
A .3 Signs of the elasticities
The signs of the elasticities of the demand function depend on the proper­
ties of the underlying utility function.
• f o i H )  denotes the change of a country’s demand for the domestic 
(foreign) good with respect to its income. If the good is a normal 
(inferior) good this term is positive (negative). We have assumed that 
each country spends a positive fraction of its income on all goods. If 
we assume that this holds as well for an additional unit of income, 
all goods are normal goods. =>■ F q{Tq) >  0
• T\ [T ] ) denotes the own price effect of a domestic (foreign) good. 
This effect is negative for normal goods and positive for Giffen goods. 
If we assume that all goods are normal with respect to changes in 
income, we have no Giffen goods33 and, hence, the demand for a good 
will always decrease when its price increases. => T\(iFj) <  0
• i is the cross price effect of the demand for good i with respect 
to the price of good j .  If i and j  are substitutes (complements) the 
cross price effect is positive (negative), assuming that good j  is a




























































































normal good. In other words, if the demand for j  falls when it 
becomes more expensive, the demand for i falls, as well, if it is a 
complement and it rises if i is a substitute for j .  If j  is a Giffen good 
it is the other way around. However, since the case of Giffen goods 
is of rather theoretical nature, we will neglect it. => T] > 0(< 0) if 
i , j  are substitutes (complements) and normal goods.
We summarize the possible combinations of the features of the expenditure 
function and how they affect the signs of the elasticities of tariffs and of 
the (real) prices in table 2.
Own price effect normal Giffen normal Giffen
Cross price effect Substitutes Complements
FÌ<o, rj>o 7̂>o, ̂ )<o, T‘a<o rj<o, ^  <o r;>o,rj>o,ri<o
Vl positive ? positive positive
m positive negative positive ?
m positive negative negative positive
6 positive negative ? positive
Table 2: The sign of the tariff and real price elasticity of demand
If not noted otherwise, we will assume that all goods are normal and 
substitutes and, hence, f7i,J?2>% and 6 are positive and, according to eqn. 




























































































Appendix B: Deriving the reduced form
We will reduce the economy’s model, eqn. (1) to eqn. (7), to two equations 
which express the equilibrium values of employment and CPI in terms 
of the policy instruments, money supplies and tariffs, and of the model 
parameters.
We assume that the expected money supply (more precisely, its deviation) 
for wagesetters is zero. Substituting equation (3) into (2) gives:
Substituting (16) and (1) into (4) yields the reduced form for employment:
Thus, employment changes one for one with the domestic money supply 
and is not affected by the other policy variables that is, foreign money 
supply or tariffs.
Substituting (9) into (16) and (1) gives the equilibrium values of the output 
and its price level:
Pi — al{ +  x (16)
1; =  m; — mf =  m; (17)
Pi =  ami +  x






























































































We substitute eqn. (19) into equation (6) and solve for 8 D?=i zij- Sub-
i¥>
stituting this expression and eqn. (18) into equation (7) gives the reduced 
form for the CPI:
q t —  “T 5(n_x) )  m i 6(n—l)2 JTl3 ^
' j—1
A ( i - y ) E * «  +  A ï E % - A ? E E < > « + *i=i i=i 7 = 1 h=l h?i
Setting the first coefficient to A and the second to k, the reduced form for 
q, can be rewritten as:
qi =  Ami—
j=lj*i
x  n  „  n  „  n  n
ü /  7=1 U 7=1 ü 7=1 h=1j?i j?i j?i h?i
+x
0




























































































Appendix C: Solving the equilibrium with a 
coalition
We will keep this analysis very short, since the main steps can be checked 
in the appendix of Kohler [11].
The countries j  =  1, . . . ,  k are members of the coalition C, the countries 
i =  k +  1 , . . . ,  n are not in the coalition. The optimization problem which 
has to be solved by the monetary authority of a country can be summarized 
as follows. Outside the coalition L, is minimized with respect to the own 
money supply; in the coalition L{ is minimized with respect to the money 
supplies of all coalition members.
m inmi)TnjLi =  - { c m }  +  (Am,- -  /c ^  my +  0  +  z ) 2)
i/i
The reaction function of a country outside the coalition A coun­
try which is not in the coalition sets its own money supply so as to minimize 
its losses. It takes the other’s money supplies as given (Nash conjectures).
minmi Li s.t. rrij =  m j V j  ^  i
The first order condition and the symmetry assumption for outsiders give 
the money supply of a non-member as a function of the coalition’s money 
supply:





























































































The reaction function of a coalition member The coalition solves 
its optimization problem subject to a given money supply of the non­
members:
k 1
mirim^c £  =  s.t. m,-=  miinc Vi =  fc +  l , . . . , n
i—i k
The first order condition together with the symmetry assumption for the 
coalition money supplies give the coalition member’s reaction function de­
pendent on the non-members’ money supplies.
„ A — n(k — 1)
a +  (A — n(k — l ))2
K ^ ) TTli'nc (Oc T
*=&+1
(21)
The equilibrium Replacing the non-members’ money supply in equa­
tion (21) with equation (20) gives the equilibrium money supply of a coali­
tion member:
< r + ( A - / c ( t - l ) ) A —K.(k— 1 )—k 2 (n -k )d k
J«(n — fc)t90nc+ 0 cj — p J«;(n — fc)i9 + lj x
and the equilibrium money supply of a non-member:
m* c =  — K̂2d2kp(n — k) +  0 nc — kdkpQc — [w +  /cdfcpj x
The sign of the coefficients
• $ is positive since it can be rewritten as d — g+A(A_A*„_tr i)) and
A — k(ti — k — 1) =  A-^- +  > 0.
• p can be rewritten as p =  p ;r+Â +Â AK*~'1̂  • P is positive since p is 
positive, for the proof, see Kohler [11}, Appendix B.l (p is equal to 




























































































Appendix D: The simulation results
In the following, we will present the results of the simulation analysis. 
There is no a-priori reason for a specific value for any of the parameter, 
hence, we chose values in the middle of the defined ranges for each para­
meters. Consequently, a robustness analysis was performed whose results 
are presented subsequently. The ‘standard values’ , that is the values if not 
noted otherwise, are:
a —  p —  t  — 0.5, (7 — 1, F j =  -0 .5 , F) =  0.45
The elasticities are calculated according to:
1h =  (1 +  F j) and =  ^ ( 1  -  F j)
Vz =  ^ 2(̂ 2 -  J?i) and 6 =  771 +  r]2 -  ^
This ensures that rji and r/2 remain within the limits and 2 ^ - ,  and r/3 
remains between zero and In addition, (—F j)  must always be higher 
than Fj if 773 has to be positive.
D .l Threshold tariffs
For each set of parameter values we calculate the minimum tariff level r 
which can sustain full coordination. In table 3, we present the results of 
the univariate analysis.
In short, the threshold tariff decreases in a,/3, (—F j)  and F l} \ it increases 




























































































a 0 . 1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
T * 3.7 1.95 0.15 0.7 0.55 0.45 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0 . 1 0.06 0.04
0 0 . 1 -0.2 0.25 -0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
T* 0.55 0.5 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
a 0 . 1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.80-1.2 1.3-2.3 2.4-2.9 3-5
T 0.15 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.35 0.4 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6
n 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 22
T 0 . 0 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0 . 1 0.2
0 . 1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
T 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
0.2 0.3 0.4
0.7 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
T 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
T ) 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
-P .
3 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.9
T 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
T ) 0.8 0.9
- ? ] 0.8 0.9 0.9
T 0.4 0.4 0.4
Table 3: The threshold tariff: univariate analysis
The damage of the tariff 0 nc increases with the propensity to import (3 and 
the tariff elasticities of the demand, rji and' rj2 (which increase in T'j and 




























































































these parameters take higher values.
The inverse is true for the number of countries n; the higher n, the fewer 
the damage caused by the tariff since the trade volume with one country is 
decreases with the number of trading partners (n — 1). Since the damage 
caused by tariffs decreases with n, the threshold tariff level must increase 
with n.
a represents the weight of the employment target in the policy maker’s ob­
jective function. A low a means that inflation is relatively more important 
and, hence, the tariff punishment which creates inflation has more impact, 
too. Therefore, for low a a lower tariff level will be sufficient to sustain 
full cooperation.
Changes of a show the largest impact on the threshold tariff level. The 
reason is that a  influences the relative importance of being able to free-ride 
and avoiding the tariff punishment. A high a  implies k, which represents 
the impact of foreign monetary policy on the ddomestic economy, is low. 
Therefore, coordinated and uncoordinated monetary policies do not differ 
very much and gains from free-riding are relatively small for high a. It 
does then not pay off to undergo a tariff punishment which does not change 
with a. Hence, the threshold tariff level is lower when a is higher.
The multivariate analysis does not give results much different from the 
univariate analysis. Hence, in table 4 we summarize only the results for 
the most influential parameter, a34. We report the threshold tariff level 
which supports full coordination for all possible values of all parameters
34We report here only a summary of the multivariate analysis. The detailed results 




























































































except for a, which is quoted explicitly. Again, a  is the most influential 
parameter and affects the threshold tariff level inversely.
a=1.0 r >  0 . 1  sustains all
a=0.9 t  >  0 . 1  sustains all
P II © oo t  >  0.3 sustains all
P II o t  >  0.3 sustains most
a=0.6 r >  0.5 sustains most
a=0.5 t >  0.9/0.7 sustains all/most
P II O t >  0.9/0.7 sustains all/most
CO©II$ t  between 0.5 and 1.7
£*=0.2 r mostly above 2, only for very high / ? ( >  0 .8) around 1
Table 4: The threshold tariff: multivariate analysis
D.2 Punishment of deviators
If the coalition cannot commit credibly to the tariff threat on e.g. insti­
tutional grounds, it may pay off for the coalition to actually punish in 
order to build up a reputation. Punishment of deviators pays off if the 
gains from the ‘additional’ coordination gained through reputation (that 
is, coordination beyond three countries) exceeds the costs of punishment. 
We calculated the costs of punishment and balanced it against the gains, 
assuming that all countries except for the ‘deviators’ join the punishment 
scheme. The punishment tariff is equal to the threshold tariff level for each 




























































































deviators which may be punished. This implies a minimum coalition size 
which is necessary that punishment of deviators pays off.
If we have six countries, it pays always to punish up to two deviators; if 
we have seven countries it pays still to punish up to three deviators; if we 
have eight countries it pays to punish up to four deviators. Since there are 
always three countries in the coalition when there are no tariff threats, this 
means that punishment of deviators is always worthwhile for the coalition 
if this ensures that at least one more member joins the coalition.
Parameter Threshold tariff Number of countries n =
r* 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
a 0.1 3.7 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
0.2 1.95 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
0.3 1.1 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
0.4 0.7 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
0.5 0.45 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
0.6 0.3 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
0.7 0.2 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
0.8 0.09 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
0.9 0.04 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
Table 5: Minimum number of countries where punishment of deviators 
pays (1)
We present the results of the univariate sensitivity analysis in table 5. The 




























































































Parameter Threshold tariff Number of countries n =
T* 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P 0.1-0.2 0.55 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
0.3-0.4 0.5 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
0.5-0.6 0.45 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
0.7-0.9 0.4 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
(J 0.1 0.15 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
0.2 0.25 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
0.3 0.3 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
0.4-0.5 0.35 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
0.6-0.7 0.4 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
0.8-1.2 0.45 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
1.3-2.3 0.5 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
2.4-2.9 0.55 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 6
Table 6: Minimum number of countries where punishment of deviators 
pays (2)
tariff punishment scheme pays) holds for all parameter values35.
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